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Abstract
Background—Tuberculosis transmission in health care settings represents a major public health 
problem. In 2010, national airborne infection control (AIC) guidelines were adopted in India. 
These guidelines included specific policies for TB prevention and control in health care settings. 
However, the feasibility and effectiveness of these guidelines have not been assessed in routine 
practice. This study aimed to conduct baseline assessments of AIC policies and practices within a 
convenience sample of 35 health care settings across 3 states in India and to assess the level of 
implementation at each facility after one year.
Method—A multi-agency, multidisciplinary panel of experts performed site visits using a 
standardized risk assessment tool to document current practices and review resource capacity. At 
the conclusion of each assessment, facility-specific recommendations were provided to improve 
AIC performance to align with national guidelines.
Result—Upon initial assessment, AIC systems were found to be poorly developed and 
implemented. Administrative controls were not commonly practiced and many departments 
needed renovation to achieve minimum environmental standards. One year after the baseline 
assessments, there were substantial improvements in both policy and practice.
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Conclusion—A package of capacity building and systems development that followed national 
guidelines substantially improved implementation of AIC policies and practice.
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1. Background
The risk of nosocomial transmission of airborne infections like Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
from individuals with disease to health care workers (HCWs) and other patients has been 
recognized for many years.1–13 A systematic review of 51 studies conducted in low- to 
middle-income countries found that TB incidence among HCWs was high, ranging from 69 
to 5780 per 100,000.1 Evidence shows that TB is a significant occupational problem among 
HCWs,1–13 especially in hospitals with no TB control measures in place.2 Nosocomial 
outbreaks of airborne infections like influenza H1N1, H5N1, drug-susceptible, multidrug-
resistant TB (MDR TB), and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR TB), especially among 
HCWs with HIV infection, and reported high rates of morbidity and mortality have been 
linked to the absence or limited application of airborne infection-control strategies.6,7,14 
Since then, there has been renewed interest in understanding the impact of infection control 
measures in medical facilities.
India is the highest TB burden country accounting for one-fourth of the global incidence 
with 2.2 million incident TB cases emerging annually.15 In 2012, India's Revised National 
TB Control Program (RNTCP) managed 1.46 million TB cases,16 and unknown thousands 
more were managed in the private sector.17–20 Prevailing infection control practices in India 
revolve around biomedical waste management and disposal of sharps; while airborne 
infection control (AIC) measures are largely absent from the health care facilities' policies 
and practices.21 Nosocomial TB has in large part not been addressed by researchers in India, 
but those few studies that have been published have uniformly reported much higher TB 
disease rates among HCW than estimated to occur in the general population.9,12,13
To address the need for a simple, effective, and affordable AIC program in health care 
facilities in India, National Guidelines on Airborne Infection Control in Health Care and 
other settings in India – 2010 (NAIC) were published as the first, formal national guidelines 
on reducing the risk of airborne infections in health care facilities and special high-risk 
settings in India (e.g. respiratory disease wards, MDR-TB wards, Antiretroviral treatment 
centers, and TB culture and drug susceptibility testing laboratories).21
Till date, there has not been any large-scale, representative assessment of AIC practices over 
a broad spectrum and at multiple levels of health care in India. Therefore, as part of the 
national effort to assess the baseline implementation of the NAIC guidelines, we conducted 
systematic facility assessments to assess the risk of airborne transmission in 35 selected 
health care facilities, ranging from tertiary level medical colleges to primary health centers 
from the 3 states of West Bengal, Gujarat, and Andhra Pradesh. Each site received a tailored 
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set of recommendations of administrative, environmental, and personal protective measures, 
in line with national guidelines.
We also sought to reassess the implementation of NAIC recommended administrative and 
managerial control measures by the administrators at state, district, and health care facilities, 
one year after baseline recommendations.
2. Objectives
• To conduct systematic baseline assessments of AIC administrative, environmental, 
and personal protective policies and practices within HCF in India and
• To assess the level of NAIC guidelines implementation after one year.
3. Methods
During October 2009–September 2011, 35 HCFs across 13 districts in 3 states of India – 
West Bengal, Gujarat, and Andhra Pradesh – were selected for facility-based assessments for 
the risk of airborne disease transmission. The states, districts, and facilities were a 
nonrepresentative convenience sample, but were purposefully selected to provide 
experiences with AIC practices at all levels of the health system. Of the 35 facilities, 11 
were from West Bengal (across 3 districts), 11 were from Gujarat (across 7 districts), and 13 
were from Andhra Pradesh (across 3 districts). At the conclusion of each assessment, a 
series of written recommendations were provided to HCF administrators to improve policies 
and practice, based on the NAIC guidelines. After one year, each facility was reassessed to 
compare NAIC implementation as compared to baseline assessment results.
A multi-agency, multidisciplinary panel of experts conducted standardized risk assessments, 
including field-based observational visits to document infection control practices, human 
resource capacity, and administrative and environmental controls. The expert panel included 
members from the respective state AIC committees with support from the Central TB 
Division – India (CTD), World Health Organization (WHO), and the Program for 
Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH). The principal investigator and most of the 
coauthors were members of these baseline assessments. A standardized risk assessment 
methodology utilized a structured reporting format covering a range of AIC interventions 
[i.e., equipment/material to conduct baseline assessment like incense sticks to assess 
direction of air flow, measuring tape to measure volume of rooms, VaneometerTM (i.e., 
swing-vane aneometer) (Dwyer Instruments, Michigan City, IN, USA) and DCFM700 
Digital Anemometer (General Tools, New York, NY USA) to measure air velocity from 
openings, AirMeter 460 (Dwyer Instruments, Michigan City, IN, USA) to measure air 
velocity from ducts, and digital and mobile phone cameras to take pictures for 
documentation]; quarterly reports on AIC to monitor implementation of AIC guidelines; 
structured checklist to monitor coordination mechanisms for tracking administrative 
activities of the state and district level coordination mechanism; and a predetermined set of 
monitoring indicators covering administrative and managerial control measures at state, 
district, and facility levels for data compilation and analysis.
Parmar et al. Page 3













4. Variables and data collection
A predetermined set of indicators of AIC policies and practices were used for describing key 
administrative, environmental, and personal protective measures (Table 1).
Data were extracted from the detailed reports of the baseline facility risk assessment of all 
the 35 HCFs. We used a structured checklist to monitor coordination mechanisms and the 
quarterly AIC reports from the state, district, and facility level submitted to CTD.
5. Data entry, quality assurance, and analysis
All data were entered twice by independent data entry operators in Epi-Info (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA) and checked for internal validation for 
quality and consistency. The two databases were then compared for discrepancies and a final 
database was created after correcting discrepancies by referring to the original records and 
consulting with the concerned HCF administrators. We compared baseline AIC practices and 
policies, and assessed any change one year later.
6. Ethical approval
As this study represents evaluation of programmatic implementation of national guidelines 
for AIC in health care facilities, there were no patient-based data and hence no human 
subjects involved as study population. No formal ethical review was required; 
however,approval for theactivitywas sought from the Central TB Division, Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, Government of India (MoHFW, GoI), as per the recommendation of the 
National Airborne Infection Control Committee.
The activities undertaken by the state, district, and HCF administrators and AIC committees 
for this evaluation were within normal scope of their work and there were no additional 
duties associated with this study. Additional review by CDC institutional review board was 
not required because CDC investigators were determined not to be engaged in human 
subjects research as defined by relevant US government regulations (i.e., CDC investigators 
did not interact with study subjects or have access to identifiable data for study subjects).
7. Results
The characteristics of the 35 HCFs assessed in the study are described in Table 2. Amongst 
the 35 HCFs, 21 had specific high-risk departments of interest: 10 (29%) had antiretroviral 
treatment (ART) centers, 7 (20%) had a bronchoscopy suite, and 4 (11%) had departments 
specializing in MDR-TB treatment. While of the highest proportion of HCFs were 
secondary-level institutes (46%), 8 (23%) were primary health centers, 7 (20%) were 
tertiary-level medical colleges, 2 (6%) were for profit, private multi-specialty hospitals, and 
2 (6%) TB laboratories.
7.1. HCF administrative IC systems
Few facilities had infection control committees (31%), infection control plans (14%), or 
infection control related activities (e.g., annual IC training) in place at baseline, and among 
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those infection control systems in place, 'airborne' related activities were not included (Table 
3).
7.2. Administrative AIC practices
Administrative measures specific to AIC were negligible. None of the facilities offered 
masks to patients with respiratory symptoms, applied fast-track screening algorithms, or 
isolated potentially infectious patients in separate waiting areas. Six (18%) facilities 
informed patients on cough hygiene, including 2 (6%) where patients were observed 
practicing proper cough hygiene/etiquette. TB surveillance among HCW (passive or active) 
was practiced only in 1 facility.
7.3. Environmental AIC measures
In total, 187 various departments across the 35 HCFs, ranging from registration and 
outpatient departments to high-risk settings, were assessed for minimum recommended 
(Table 6) air changes per hour (ACH). Almost half of the departments assessed (n = 103) did 
not have the minimum recommended ACH at the time of testing. Notably, minimum ACH 
was determined to be achievable in 73% of the departments with natural ventilation alone 
(i.e., by virtue of the design of the health care facility structures), or through minor 
renovation. However, 51 (27%) of the departments tested required major renovations, 
decompression, or relocation of waiting areas to achieve the minimum ACH and prevent 
airborne transmission from infectious patients.
7.4. Personal protective AIC measures
Among the high-risk departments where infectious TB was most likely to be encountered 
(e.g. TB culture and drug susceptibility testing laboratories, MDR-TB treatment wards, and 
ART Centers), routine N95 respirators use was observed in only 2 of the 21 facilities with 
specific high-risk departments listed in Table 2. Unfortunately, in both departments, proper 
technique for use and fit needed improvement; there was no record of proper fit testing or 
training for the respirators issued.
7.5. Reported improvements in AIC activities one year after baseline assessments
The implementation of administrative and managerial control measures reported by the 
administrators at state, district, and health care facilities, one year after issuance of baseline 
recommendations, are described in Table 4. It was encouraging to observe that the efforts of 
advocacy, capacity building, coordination mechanisms, baseline assessments, and follow-up 
with state and districts officials and HCF administrators lead to substantial improvement in 
AIC policy and practice. Moreover, the lessons learnt to mitigate the challenges faced after 
the baseline assessment and recommendations are summarized in Table 5. As a health 
system strengthening activity, this experience has developed into a broader initiative to 
ensure greater accountability, systematic scale-up, and sustainability of AIC systems in the 
country.
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Our assessment and intervention involved purposively selected states and a limited number 
of purposively selected health care facilities. These may not be representative or applicable 
across all settings in India. The effect of the intervention on infection control policies and 
practices was assessed from regular reports provided by the facilities, and those results were 
not independently validated. Follow-up assessment on adherence to environmental 
recommendations has not yet been conducted at the time of preparation of this paper. A 
sequel to this study is planned in which all the 35 health care facilities will be subjected to 
post-assessments using the same methodology as the baseline. This will give a comparison 
with greater validity and also open the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of 
environmental and personal protective measures recommended in the baseline risk 
assessments in line with the national guidelines. Although, air velocity was measured in 
various settings to assess ACH, measurement of ventilation, e.g., using tracer gas (e.g., CO2) 
dilution methods, could not be undertaken as the objectives focused around assessing 
feasibility of implementation of AIC measures in health care settings in India. The study 
also does not assess the impact of these interventions on reduction of nosocomial 
transmission, neither by surveillance among HCWs nor use of tuberculin skin tests at entry 
level and annually, as there were no human subjects involved and this is beyond the scope of 
the study objectives.
9. Discussion
Across a broad range of health facilities in 3 states, AIC practices were poorly implemented 
prior to the adoption of the NAIC guidelines. Specifically, AIC systems in India were 
underdeveloped, the airborne component was generally not included in existing infection 
control systems, and administrative controls were not commonly practiced. There were IC 
systems in place in many settings, and those could be leveraged for AIC through training 
and education of key staff members. About half of the departments surveyed within the 
participating facilities needed minor renovation to achieve minimum environmental 
standards. Most environments could be effectively ventilated with natural ventilation, but 
nonusage of available ventilation (i.e., shut windows) or layered modifications, such as 
deliberate blocking of windows, had reduced the potential ventilation. This is substantiated 
by the study on natural ventilation by Escombe et al.,22 which concluded that opening 
windows and doors maximizes natural ventilation so that the risk of airborne contagion is 
much lower than with costly, maintenance-requiring mechanical ventilation systems. Natural 
ventilation is particularly suited to limited-resource settings and tropical climates, where the 
burden of TB and institutional TB transmission is highest. The tendency toward better 
climate control with air-conditioners created AIC risk and engineers will need to be 
sensitized on optimizing the balance of cooling expense and risk and comfort.
Use of personal protective measures by HCWs was found to be negligible even in high-risk 
settings. This challenge might be overcome through proper training, education, and 
monitoring mechanisms. It was observed that HCWs were well trained and demonstrated 
competency with other infection control practice, such as biomedical waste management. 
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Integrating AIC principles into existing general infection control training and education 
modules was recommended.
Despite poor implementation of AIC practices at baseline, we found substantially improved 
AIC practices after raising awareness of the NAIC guidelines and offering facility-specific 
recommendations to enhance policy and improve practice. This suggests that concerted 
effort to implement NAIC guidelines can effectively improve facility infection control 
standards and limit the risk of nosocomial airborne infection transmission, even in settings 
where AIC measures were lacking.
Our experience demonstrates that AIC implementation is fundamentally feasible, even in 
low-resource settings. India needs to move toward scale-up of the intervention package, with 
emphasis on integration of AIC into existing health system IC activities that include 
development and implementation of an integrated comprehensive infection control training 
material for frontline HCWs. The systematic scale-up across all health care facilities in the 
country can serve as preparedness plan for airborne pathogens of pandemic potentials. This 
can also help curb transmission of endemic diseases like TB and M/XDR TB, as a primary 
prevention intervention to complement the larger TB control efforts in India.
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Table 1
Component-wise themes to assess administrative, environmental, and personal protective AIC measures.
Component Themes
1. Administrative AIC 
measures
i. HCF administrative IC systems with AIC components (e.g., established IC Committees, IC Focal 
points, written AIC plan)
ii. Administrative AIC practices (e.g., screening, fast-tracking, segregation of infectious cases, TB 
surveillance in health care workers.)
2. Environmental AIC 
measures
i. Environmental IC aspects of various general health departments like Registration, outpatient and 
inpatient areas, Radiology, Pharmacy.
ii. Environmental IC aspects of special high-risk settings like ART Centers, Integrated HIV Counseling 
and Testing Centers, Microscopy Centers, MDR TB Wards, MTB Culture-DST laboratories, and 
Bronchoscopy Centers (e.g., minimum air change per hour, building designs facilitating minimum air 
change per hour)
3. Personal protective 
AIC measures
i. Availability and use of N95 particulate respirators in high-risk settings (e.g., ART Centers, MDR TB 
wards, Bronchoscopy suits.)
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Table 2
Characteristics of the Health Care Facilities assessed (N = 35).
Characteristic n (%)
State
Andhra Pradesh 13 (37%)
Gujarat 11 (31%)
West Bengal 11 (31%)
Type of facility
Medical college 7 (20%)
Private tertiary 2 (6%)
District or subdistrict hospital 11 (32%)
Primary health care center 8 (23%)
TB hospital or clinic 4 (12%)
TB laboratories 2 (6%)
ART only 1 (3%)
Facilities with specific high-risk departments
ART Centers 10 (29%)
Bronchoscopy suites 7 (20%)
MDR TB Wards 4 (11%)
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Table 3
Results of baseline HCF AIC risk assessment: Administrative IC systems and practices; environmental and 
personal protective AIC measures (N = 35).
Indicator N = 35 (%)
HCF administrative IC systems with AIC components
IC Committee in place 11 (31%)
IC Committee met regularly (>2 times per year) 8/11 (73%)
Written IC plan available 5 (14%)
Written plan includes AIC 0/5 (0%)
IC focal point in place 7 (20%)
Funds routinely available for IC 7 (20%)
IC training for health care workers conducted annually 5 (14%)
IC training includes AIC 1/5 (20%)
Administrative AIC practices
Cough hygiene information in registration/waiting areas 6/33 (18%)a
Patients observed to practice cough hygiene 9/33
Chest symptomatics given masks/tissues/counseling 0/33 (0%)
Dustbins for disposal of any masks/tissues 9 (26%)
Screening and fast-tracking of chest symptomatics 0/33 (0%)
Separation of chest symptomatics in waiting areas 0/33 (0%)
Inpatient segregation practiced by nursing staff 3/23 (13%)
Designated staff responsible for opening windows/vents 0
TB surveillance among HCW (passive or active) 1 (3%)
Environmental AIC measures
Number of departments assessed 187 (100%)
Minimum ACH possible with natural ventilation alone (including those where minor renovation required) 137 (73%)
Waiting areas that need decompression or relocation 85/165 (52%)
Requiring renovation to achieve minimum ACH, decompression, or segregation 86 (46%)
Personal protective AIC measures
HCFs where N95 respirators were observed to be used by HCWs in high-risk settings 2/21 (10%)
a
Labs excluded.
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Table 4
Uptake of the administrative and managerial control measures: one-year follow-up results from AIC reporting 
system.
Indicator of administrative AIC measures Baseline (n/N) One year (n/Na) Percent change
HCF with IC Committee in place 11/35 27/34 48%
IC committee meeting regularly 8/11 21/27 5%
Written IC plan available 5/35 19/34 42%
Written IC plan includes AIC 0/5 19/19 100%
IC focal point in place 7/35 30/34 68%
Health care worker surveillance (passive/active) 1/35 17/34 47%
Cough hygiene information 6/33 21/34 44%
Screening and fast-trackingb 0/33 20/32 63%
Separation of suspectsb 0/33 18/32 56%
a
1/35 HCF did not report.
b
2 labs excluded.
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Table 5
Lessons learnt: one-year follow-up of pilot implementation of national AIC guidelines.
Challenges Mitigation measures
Gap in engineering capacity to implement 
environmental recommendations
4 architects from India trained in AIC at Boston (PIH-CDC) followed by in-country 
training of architects/engineers of 6 states with support of PATH in 2010–11
Routine quarterly AIC reporting Intensive efforts to generate reasonable levels of reporting
Slow actions by HCF on recommendations from 
baseline assessments
Periodic reviews of progress made by HCF on recommendations from baseline 
assessments and site visits if required
Frequent change IC focal point in many facilities of 
Andhra Pradesh state
Resensitization of new IC focal points in the state
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Table 6
Minimum air-changes per hour (ACH) required for various health care settings.21
Type of health care setting Minimum ACH Minimum ventilation rate (l/s/patient)
Registration/Waiting >6 >40
Outpatient departments >6 >40
Inpatient departments >6 >40
High-risk settings >12 80–160
 ART Centers
 TB/Chest departments
 Bronchoscopy procedure rooms
 MDR-TB wards and clinics
 Airborne isolation rooms
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